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By winning a diplomatic coup in the crisis over Iraq, Russia's foreign minister has 
decisively proven Dale Carnegie wrong. You don't need to "change your thoughts" to 
"change the world." You just need to change everyone else's.
Six years ago, as a special envoy of then-Soviet president Michael Gorbachev, 
Primakov arrived in Baghdad on the eve of the first Western attack. So hopeful was he 
of spinning out an international agreement to avoid the war that he remained in the Iraqi 
capital until the bombs began to fall, and had to be driven hastily out of the country, 
peace proposals in hand.
Since then Primakov has fashioned his own vision of the "new world order," one 
specifically designed to lure the disenchanted of the world to Russia's side. His efforts 
have paid off. When Saddam Hussein expelled United Nations observers from Iraq in 
late October, it was Primakov, not the West, that determined the outcome of the crisis. 
As Washington fumed on the sidelines, Primakov held court in Moscow, promising, 
according to The Washington Times, an end to American military threats if Hussein 
agreed to allow an altered inspection team back into his country. (1)
There is good reason to fear that Primakov's initiative has derailed the weapons-
inspections program that victory in the Gulf War guaranteed. As William Safire has 
written, American agreement that the inspections teams be modified will "remove the 
element of surprise from the U.N. Special Commission's searches for long-concealed 
germ warfare facilities." (2)
1
Such aid to a rogue regime is, sadly, entirely consistent with a recent turn in Russia's 
foreign policy, which is itself indicative of a new mood in Moscow--one Primakov has 
helped to create.
Filling the Void
Although largely successful in implementing dramatic economic and political reforms, 
the Yel'tsin administration has failed to provide Russia with an identity to replace the 
void left when the ideology of Communism crumbled.
"Russian society craves the elaboration of its central purpose, an idea that animates 
and directs us in the new epoch," Nugzar Betaneli, a Russian sociologist, told The 
Hindustan Times. (3)
The hunger for a new national identity is prompted in part by the profound sense of 
dissatisfaction with the imported "Western" order, particularly among intellectuals. 
Writing in Rossiyskaya gazeta, Roy Medvedev decried calls for a fascist regime, but 
claimed that "no less dangerous are the attempts to turn Russia into a commonplace 
country of the Western type, thrusting upon it Western values and American-model 
capitalism, which are alien to our people."(4)
The key to national restoration, Medvedev wrote, lay in a new assertiveness on the 
world stage. "Neither 'humility' nor the position of a client of the West will help change 
the situation. We must stop the country's decline, including by means of foreign policy."
Primakov has taken up this challenge with relish. In his speeches and actions, he has 
reconstituted Soviet-style hatred of the West in a new doctrine of "multipolarity." The 
United States ought to view this ideology warily, since Primakov and his minions are 
promulgating a vision of the world that has once again set Russia on a course towards 
international adventurism.
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Weaving a Web of Contacts
A look at the biography of Primakov reveals a man utterly devoted to the enhancement 
of Moscow's prestige and, more ominously, one well-prepared to win his adopted nation 
accolades once again as a powerful alternative to the West.
Born on October 29, 1929, in Tbilisi, Primakov spent his childhood in a cosmopolitan 
section of the city, and thus speaks Georgian and Armenian well. (5) He has 
assiduously air-brushed all references to his childhood and natural family out of his 
official biography. "Zheyna did not care to talk about [his family]," Primakov's classmate 
at the Moscow Institute for Oriental Studies told Argumenty i fakty, "and had a fierce 
abhorrence of those who attempted to question him about anything." (6)
After marrying the daughter of KGB official Mikhail Gvishiani (and sister of Dzherman 
Gvishiani, subsequently the son-in-law of Premier Aleksei Kosygin), Primakov 
abandoned his graduate studies at Moscow State University, where he had been 
focusing on the economics of Arab countries. He moved into the workforce with a series 
of reporting and editing jobs at the State Committee on Radio and Television 
Broadcasting.
It was as a journalist that Primakov first began to weave the web of reporting contacts 
and political affiliations, at home and abroad, that was to lay the foundation for his future 
career. He advanced swiftly through the ranks of state radio and joined the Communist 
Party in 1959. (7) Three years later he won a post as a deputy editor of Pravda and 
became a foreign correspondent in the Middle East.
Primakov's posting abroad almost certainly introduced him to the intelligence game. 
"Because virtually no Soviet citizen lived abroad without being vetted by the KGB, one 
can assume that Primakov became an intelligence asset early in his career," an 
American analyst has concluded. (8) Arguing that rumors of Primakov's early spying 
were "not groundless," Moscow News pointed out that a retired KGB general, Oleg 
Kalugin, believed that two-thirds of Soviet correspondents working abroad were agents. 
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(9) Even others more circumspect maintain that he was at least "a man of the KGB First 
Main Directorate, whose business was intelligence, and a good dozen further 
organizations, in which science, journalism, diplomacy and intelligence were interwoven 
into a single whole." (10)
Primakov cultivated the big names of the Middle East, including Mustafa Barazani, later 
leader of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, Hosni Mubarak, future Egyptian president, 
Jordan's King Hussein, and a young Iraqi Ba'athist leader named Saddam Hussein. (11) 
Upon returning to Moscow, Primakov took up a number of positions within the USSR 
Academy of Sciences, including directorship of both the Institute of Oriental [i.e., Middle 
Eastern] Studies and the prestigious Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations. From these postings he supervised "brainstorming" sessions on problems of 
Soviet foreign policy, inviting not only scholars, but also experts from the Central 
Committee, the intelligence community and the foreign ministry. Transcripts of these 
seminars were "taken down in shorthand, then summarized, and ultimately converted 
into a concise document containing practical recommendations which ended up on the 
desks of certain members of the Politburo," Argumenty i fakty notes, "usually Gromyko 
and Andropov." (12) Moreover, Primakov was able to extend his network by supervising, 
for example, the doctoral theses of Saddam Hussein's cousin and of the daughter of 
Azeri premier Geidar Aliev. (13)
Primakov's politicking at home earned him the dubious reward of a first-class cabin on a 
sinking ship--the Communist Party. An alternate member of the party's Central 
Committee in 1986, and head of one chamber of the USSR Supreme Soviet in June 
1989, Primakov watched his career come apart together with the Soviet Union itself. He 
hedged his bets. On the one hand, he sought out the liberal reformers. In the spring of 
1989, he had the audacity not merely to attend the first meeting of the Interregional 
Group of Deputies along with Boris Yel'tsin and Anatoli Sobchak, but even to stride 
confidently to the lectern and deliver an impromptu speech. (14) Primakov nevertheless 
continued to do the Party's bidding, no matter how brutal. As the informal supervisor of 
troubled Azerbaijan, Primakov at first negotiated with the country's Popular Front, but as 
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the threat of general strikes loomed, clamped down. On January 19, 1990, he warned 
participants at a meeting of the Azerbaijani Communist Party that Moscow would 
tolerate no more unrest.
"The militia, troops of the MVD, the KGB and the Procuracy--these additional forces 
have arrived from Moscow," he said. "Everything is being done to restore order. 
Additional measures will be necessary. Additional measures will be taken. But, we can 
tell you firmly, order will be restored." (15) In the subsequent crackdown, 130 Azeri 
protesters were killed. 700 more were wounded.
Primakov's fence-sitting paid off. He slipped into Mikhail Gorbachev's inner circle as a 
member of the new Presidential Council. From his seat in the Kremlin he was finally 
able to turn his long-nurtured ties to leaders in the Middle East into tools of an assertive 
foreign policy. His long-standing friendship with Saddam Hussein, for example, allowed 
him to insert himself briefly as a self-appointed mediator between Iraq and the West on 
the eve of the Gulf War. Although his initiative failed, it won him a reputation among 
Moscow's old guard as an apostle of "new thinking" who could nonetheless "maintain 
Moscow's old influence in Iraq and the Middle East." (16) Forever straddling camps, 
Primakov was able to win a key post from Gorbachev--head of the Soviet Foreign 
Intelligence Service (successor to the KGB's 1st Directorate)--and hold on to it even as 
the Soviet Union crumbled and Boris Yel'tsin began fashioning the new Russian state.
It should not surprise Primakov-watchers that the man for whom foreign policy and 
personal ambition were so intertwined should hold fast only to the idea that the new 
Russia must remain a great power. The moderate policies vis-à-vis the West that Andrei 
Kozyrev pursued as foreign minister in the early 1990s not only appeared to diminish 
the influence of the state Primakov had unswervingly served; they also reduced the role 
of members of Primakov's personal cadre, who retained ties to rogue regimes. A policy 
of accommodating the West could only frustrate the ranks of soldiers, foreign policy 
experts and intelligence officers in Primakov's own inner circle, who knew far less of, 
say, Denmark, than they did of Iraq and other former client states of the Soviet Union.
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As intelligence chief Primakov inspired his extensive network of journalists and 
apparatchiki into rebellion against their own foreign minister, e.g., by publishing a review 
in December 1993, arguing that Kozyrev's tacit acceptance of NATO expansion ran 
counter to Russian interests. (17) In the end, Primakov won his appointment as 
Kozyrev's successor by waging a campaign of disinformation of the kind that an aspiring 
ideologue would once have turned against a foreign power, according to a review of his 
career by Duma deputy Konstantin Borovoi.
Throughout 1995, Yel'tsin was bombarded by reports that a Western diplomat had found 
Russia's response to US foreign policy to be surprisingly passive. "Under the heading 
'Top Secret,' the President received the same piece of misleading information from the 
intelligence service, the counterintelligence service and then from military intelligence," 
Borovoi wrote. By the time that it was revealed that the diplomat had been speaking of 
France--not Russia--the damage to Kozyrev's reputation had already been done.
Primakov has also manipulated public opinion, which today is hostile to NATO 
expansion (while only 18 percent of Russian citizens had any comment on the issue two 
years ago). Primakov orchestrated his campaign, Borovoi writes, by leaking information 
to pliant Russian journalists. "A careful reader may have noticed," Borovoi comments, 
"that in the past two years perfectly independent papers have run stories with matching 
paragraphs." (18)
It is a tribute to Primakov's deftness that he should have been appointed by Yel'tsin to 
assuage a new mood of national assertiveness--reflected in the electoral success of the 
Communists and neofascist "Liberal Democrats"--that Primakov himself helped to 
create. When both Gennadi Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky praised his appointment 
as foreign minister, they may well have merely been repaying the compliment that 
Primakov's promulgation of their ideas had extended to them.
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The 'Multipolar' Mission
Primakov is not a field commander in some new "Clash of Civilizations." He is only 
interested in the trappings of traditions, such as the Russian Orthodox Church, as a 
means to an end. When, for example, it is time to pressure a NATO member such as 
Turkey, or a Western ally in the Muslim world such as Azerbaijan, Primakov's ministry 
will sign a defense alliance with Armenia, or overlook arms shipments to "Christian" 
allies in hotspots like Nagorno-Karabakh or Greek Cyprus. The point is simply to 
destabilize Western allies, not to enhance ancient cultural ties. There is no traditional 
Orthodox empathy for Turkey's Kurds. But Primakov's ministry was happy to help host a 
conference on their plight in Moscow in March, at which delegates pledged to pressure 
Turkey by establishing a Kurdish radio network within its borders.
Indeed, a forthright expression of good old Slavophil paranoia is likely to earn a minister 
nothing but Primakov's wrath. Last December Igor Rodionov, then Russia's defense 
minister, gave a rousing call to arms among his counterparts from other countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, in which he added Iran and China to a long list 
of common foes. Primakov's ministry publicly scolded him the next day, calling the list 
"purely hypothetical." Within six months, Rodionov had been dumped. Rodionov was 
out of step with Primakov's "multipolar" agenda. Unlike Slavophils, Primakov does not 
see a "Yellow Horde" riding out of Beijing, or an army of Allah massing along Mother 
Russia's underbelly.
In effect, "multipolarity" has been little more than a rallying cry for every regime with a 
chip on its shoulder about the hegemony of the United States. It is a doctrine steeped in 
cultural relativism; under the guise of tolerance of "differences," Russia is free to cozy 
up to rogue states and movements especially in its Eurasian backyard.
Take, for example, the "Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration About a Multipolar World and 
the Formation of a New International order," signed in Moscow on April 23. While 
nominally tolerant, the declaration is particularly opposed to the liberal democratic order. 
There is a hint of the old anti-imperialist rhetoric in the document which makes 
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reference to the "numerous developing countries and the Non-Aligned movement" that 
will be "an important force assisting the formation of a multipolar world and new 
international order." (19) The full implications of this declaration and of Primakov's 
address at July's meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were 
spelled out by Obshchaya gazeta's Anna Perfilyeva. Perfilyeva hailed Primakov's 
"brilliant maneuver" and applauded the "wonderful way" he had of "giving vent to the 
irritation about the unceremoniousness of American foreign policy which has been 
building up deep inside ASEAN..." which "warmed the feelings of religious solidarity 
among the ASEAN choir leaders, Indonesia and Malaysia, the majority of whose 
populations profess Islam." Perfilyeva wrote that "Behind the dissatisfaction expressed 
by their ministers over American moves in the Middle East one could distinctly read: Do 
not interfere and teach others how to live if you cannot cope with the role of 
peacekeeper yourself." (20)
The doctrine has also proven quite popular with other regimes resentful of US 
dominance. One Chinese diplomat described the joint declaration as an expression of 
"common opposition to any country's taking tyrannical actions in the international arena. 
The earth is colorful and cannot be artificially changed into one single color," (21) as if 
free elections and imprisonment of political dissidents were merely different shades in a 
splendid rainbow. The Tehran Times said that "Russia, China, and the Non-Aligned 
countries combined can contain US expansionism. They should not allow the US to 
change the contour of the world into a unipolar order...." (22)
In recent months the appeal of Primakov's doctrine has spread beyond the usual 
collection of disgruntled regimes to some of America's closest allies. At a Council of 
Europe meeting in October, Russia decried America's insistence that France drop its 
plans to finance an oil pipeline in Iran. In a thinly-veiled reference to "Uncle Sam," 
Primakov's boss called on his colleagues to forge a new pan-European foreign policy. 
"We do not need an uncle from elsewhere," Yel'tsin said. "We in Europe can unite 
ourselves." (23) These statements must have struck a chord: French premier Lionel 
Jospin has now adopted Primakov's line on a new "multipolar world." (24)
8
The New Axis
The ideology of "multipolarity" has given new caché to Russian foreign policy initiatives 
that, in a time of less Western self-doubt, might merely be condemned as mischief-
making. In particular, Primakov has returned to his old stomping grounds in the Middle 
East with a panache he seems to have stolen from the actual winners of the Cold War.
The Tehran Times hardly needed to convince Primakov to rally the wretched of the earth 
in a new anti-American alliance. Building a strong alliance with Iran has been a critical 
element of the foreign minister's game plan, for two reasons.
As the two most powerful players on the shores of the oil-rich Caspian Sea, Russia and 
Iran can cooperate to bully the three smaller littoral nations into signing exploration and 
pipeline deals that suit them. Iran has been particularly helpful, for example, in agreeing 
with Moscow that the sea should be defined as a lake and therefore not be divided into 
zones of equal standing under international law. In August, Tehran secured a promise 
from Turkmenistan to adhere to "previously concluded treaties between the USSR and 
Iran" until the legal status of the Caspian Sea has been established. (25)
In exchange for such assistance, Russia is more than happy to provide Iran with the 
technology to produce powerful weapons. Israeli intelligence has reported that Russia is 
helping Iran to build long-range missiles that could be fielded within three years, 
according to The Washington Times. Iran, according to the report, is constructing two 
systems based on a North Korean model that have a range of 1,200 miles, and which 
could therefore threaten both the state of Israel and US troops based in Saudi Arabia.
Primakov has denied that Russia is aiding Iranians at all, but the sheer number of firms 
and institutes implicated implies that he is being disingenuous. Among the Russian firms 
accused of helping the Iranians are Rosvooruzhenie, the Russian arms-export agency; 
the Bauman Institute, a leading Russian technological institute; and NPO Trud, a rocket-
motor builder. (26)
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Such assistance is not merely compensation for support on Caspian questions. On his 
most recent tour of the region, Primakov's ties to Iran gave him an opening with Syrian 
President Hafiz al-Asad, who in turn entrusted him with a message to Israel, following 
which Primakov hinted that he had reopened the "Syrian-Israel" track of the Madrid 
accords. "There are people who think that one can proceed along only one track, for 
example the Palestinian one," Primakov said. "But if the Syrian track is blocked, the 
whole peace process in the region will be stopped." (27) Only Israeli fortitude prevented 
Primakov from gaining a foothold at the talks.
For all the dangers inherent in a new Axis on the Caspian, no Russian gesture better 
illustrates the effectiveness of Primakov's message and "personal diplomacy" than 
Moscow's coddling of Iraq. In Saddam Hussein, Primakov has a friend of nearly thirty 
years, one whose intransigence guarantees that he will always be available as a foil to 
the West.
To be sure, Russian business has much to gain from standing by the Baghdad regime. 
Analyzing international business deals with Baghdad, the newspaper Rossiyskaya 
gazeta concluded that Russian oil firms are "now ahead of their competitors in 
reestablishing ties to Iraq." (28) A Russian consortium, for example, has concluded a 
$3.8 billion contract to develop the Western Qurnah oil field.
But Saddam also presents Primakov with free advertising for his relativistic worldview. 
By defying an international embargo since the end of the Gulf War six years ago, 
Hussein has demonstrated that he has no intention of dropping his chemical weapons 
programs. His very inflexibility prompts doubts about the wisdom of American resolve: 
Why should the world postpone doing business with Iraq until the fall of Saddam's 
regime, when Primakov's "multipolar" vision offers an alternative by which the Baghdad 
regime is merely recognized as one of the colors in politics' colorful mosaic?
The appeal of such a tolerant "multipolar" resolution to the crisis was visible in the 
reactions of the other members of the UN Security Council. The first vote to tighten 
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sanctions after Saddam expelled UN weapons inspectors was 10-0--because Russia, 
China, France, Egypt and Kenya all abstained. In a later vote, however, the United 
States was forced to drop a proposed threat of military action as it became clear that 
Primakov had sown up enough abstentions to block its passage.
Speaking on CNN, Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering said the earlier 
abstentions "at least were a contributing factor, perhaps, to enticing Saddam or maybe 
encouraging Saddam with the feeling that the unity of the Security Council had 
fallen." (29)
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